



# Bosnia and Herzegovina in a Search for Civic Culture of Public Accountability: Role of Religious Education in Public Schools

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## Executive Summary

This paper is an attempt to position the confessional religious education (CRE) in public schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) in the context of an ongoing campaign for the development of a resilient, civic culture. The type of civics envisioned would foster a strong, supportive attitude of BH citizens towards public and social accountability as a part of a preventive and comprehensive approach to fight against corruption present in the public sector. The study formulates policy through which CRE in public schools might assume a positive and unique role in formal civic education by grounding basic principles underlying the notion of public and social accountability in religious components of indigenous culture and consequently individual religious conviction and identity of the youngest BH citizens. This policy is in line with international practices and recommendations of international and local organizations, and within the boundaries of the current status of religious communities (RCs) and CRE in the BH legal framework as well as in light of moral teachings of three traditional religions in BH. This paper argues that *despite obvious failures of CRE in primary schools in BH to employ religious values in promoting principles of good governance and active citizenship – otherwise essentially compatible with the moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy – CRE could be constructively used to educate the youngest generations about the meaning and importance of public and social accountability in their religion, thus preparing them for life in a society based on participative democracy.*

To test the hypothesis first we studied the meaning and understanding of public and social accountability in Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. Next we researched the most effective international practices in formal civic education and the role of religious education in this regard as well as models of civic education employed in BH primary schools at the moment. We also analyzed textbooks currently used in formal subjects on civic education in primary schools; compared those findings with textbooks of CRE currently used in primary schools as well as available expert assessments and reports about the content of CRE textbooks; interviewed stakeholders and did an extensive literature review.

It was found that the current attitude of BH citizens towards public and social accountability is characterized by serious deficiencies. On the other side, formal civic education in public schools represents one of the standard measures in promoting values of good governance

and active citizenship in EU countries, whereby explicit interdisciplinary teaching and having a separate subject on civics are two models adopted in an overwhelming majority of developed democracies. In addition, teaching civic values through religious education was found to be a highly recommended practice in documents of the Council of Europe and regular educational practice in many EU countries. Similarly, according to our literature review, moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy are essentially compatible with the values and principles underlying the notion of public and social accountability, and accordingly could be valuable resources in promoting values of good and accountable governance and civic activism. Nevertheless, CRE in primary schools has completely overlooked this cultural capital of their respective religious traditions.

In 2006 the Federation Ministry of Education adopted a less effective, implicit approach to civic education while representatives of RCs have been under continuous pressure to adjust discourse of CRE in line with pressing needs and issues of here and now, including life in society based on participative democracy. Now, this period has the potential to be a turning point for formal civic education as well as the role of CRE in BH schools. Any approach to reform would need to take into consideration not only the current high approval of pupils and relevant NGOs for explicit civic education, but also the local NGOs and parents who support adjusting discourse of CRE according to the needs of life in a society based on participative democracy. We also need to look at the recent calls of the international community, the respectable status of CRE in public schools, the decent level of receptiveness on the part of RCs in regard to earlier suggestions of similar analysis, and the measures proposed in the last anti-corruption strategy and general BH legal landscape. Weighing all of these factors, keeping the initially implemented, explicit approach to civic education in BH while improving and fine-tuning the CRE content would be the most logical, effective, feasible, socially and politically acceptable option for correcting the existing deficiencies in the civic culture of public and social accountability through the means of formal education. Radical change is simply not realistic and even needed. Improvement and fine-tuning of CRE, would include revision of CRE curricula for primary schools, textbooks and teaching methods, and adequate CRE teachers training.

The advantages of this approach are in its effectiveness in educating about the meaning of public and social accountability, its capacity to relate the taught material to the values of indigenous culture, its social comprehensiveness in terms of employing capacities and social influence of RCs and CRE, its wide social acceptance, minimal costs and reasonable political feasibility. The only potential disadvantage is that pupils who have decided not to attend CRE will not fully benefit from the measure, which, however, might be rectified by introducing an alternative course on Culture of Religions that eventually can implement the suggestions of our study as well. Supported by public educational authorities, the proposed measure, in the long term, can be reasonably expected to do a good job of explaining the religious significance of public accountability. While integrating religious communities and religious people into the mainstream, society will be able to put them under pressure to be more socially accountable too. The Federal Nine Years Education Program for Primary Schools and its potential implementation by cantons, improvement of the CRE curricula and textbooks, training of CRE teachers, and relationship with RCs are critical areas in formal civic education that require urgent attention and coordinated action of educational authorities, anti-corruption agencies and bodies, and RC.



## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1. Statement of Intent	5
1.2. Methodology and Limitations	6
<b>2. Problem Description</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Current Nature and Background of Problem	7
2.2. The Problem within its Current Policy Environment	12
2.3. Religious Education in Service of Active Citizenship and Public Accountability	16
<b>3. Policy Options</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1. Possible Options	21
3.2. Framework of Analysis	23
3.3. Non-Preferred Options	25
3.4. Preferred Policy Option	28
<b>4. Conclusion and Recommendations</b>	<b>29</b>
4.1. Recommendations to Government	31
4.2. Recommendations to Religious Communities	32
4.3. Recommendations to International and Domestic Organizations	32
<b>5. Bibliography</b>	<b>33</b>

## 1. Introduction

According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International for 2010, with the score of 3.2, BH ranks as the 91<sup>st</sup> country among 178 countries covered by this study (Transparency International, 2010). This score makes BH a country with the highest level of corruption in the region, excluding Kosovo, and puts it at the very bottom of the scale compared to the EU countries. A score that approximates 3.0 on the CPI scale stands for borderline, where corruption is present to the extent of systemic phenomenon (Blagovčanin, 2009). This score indicates just how severe the situation is in BH.

Various attempts to fight corruption through promoting public accountability as a core democratic value of good and effective governance so far have miserably failed in BH, as a World Bank study (2009) reports that the Bosnian government is the least accountable one among countries of former Yugoslavia, excluding again only Kosovo. The same report shows that only 48.6% of world countries have a weaker accountability index. Main factors usually blamed for accountability deficiency in the BH public sector include: weakness of civil society (CSO) organizations, absence of clear rules and laws regulating behavior of public officials, nonexistence or weakness of state institutions responsible for monitoring and sanctioning unaccountable conduct, and an attitude of tolerance towards corruption by both administration officials and ordinary citizens (Blagovčanin, 2009; Milanović, 2005).

Given that absolute power, to use the famous words of Hobbes, corrupts absolutely, active citizenship participation in demanding accountability on the part of public servants becomes a necessary requirement for creating good government. In that sense, civic education and raising social awareness about the importance of public accountability and participative democracy have been included at least in some anti-corruption strategies and programs of relevant local agencies and organizations, whereby *all state and social institutions* are expected to contribute in educating people about the dangers of corruption and building a civic culture of public accountability.

But why so far has this campaign for creating a civic culture of intolerance towards various forms of unaccountable behavior present in public sector obviously failed? For what reasons has the campaign failed to include all social institutions and most notably among them religion and RCs? At a time when we are witnessing how the social influence of religion can be skillfully abused for various purposes, could the enormous spiritual and motivational capital instead be constructively channeled to inform and shape a civic culture of the young during the formative stages of their development? For this matter, are values and teachings of Christianity and Islam compatible with the modern notions of public and social accountability? Precisely which religious notions and sacred texts could be reinterpreted to accommodate for these principles? Should accordingly modified CRE be used in order to ground civic culture of school children in their religious consciousness? As for the public authorities, would such an initiative be understood as undesirable interfering of religion and RCs in the secular sphere, again raising a question of the extent and ways in which religious conviction should inform the exercise of political power of ordinary citizens? Would such a presence of religion in public schools bring more damage than benefit for an already troubled country? Is it indeed true that RCs make no significant effort in the struggle against corruption? If public authorities even welcome such engagement of religious sentiment, are the textbooks and teachers of CRE in public schools well prepared for such a process?



Two things are apparently obvious. First, policy makers are either losing interest in formal civic education or there is serious inconsistency in their attitude in this regard. Second, in this context they have ignored ongoing debates among intellectuals and different value and interest groups about the current and prospective role of religion and CRE in BH society, the public square, and state schools. By doing so they have completely failed to constructively react and adequately engage religion and RCs in civic education. However, one thing is sure: given the current civic disengagement of BH citizens, it is difficult to imagine public authorities complying with principles of good and accountable governance. While policy makers, respective NGOs and the international community are trying to build civic morality of young generations, it is critically important for their success to continue insisting on explicit civic education in public schools. It is also imperative to ground values and principles underlying public and social accountability in religious identity and conviction of BH people through the means of CRE. Thus, teaching civic morality through CRE represents just one, but very important, dimension of broader efforts in creating a positive cultural environment for efficient changes in the institution of public accountability.

### **1.1. Statement of Intent**

The aim of this paper is to try to provide answers for the above questions in a way that is compatible with relevant international practices in developed democracies, thus enabling civic education and CRE in public schools to contribute in building a civic culture of public accountability. For that purpose this study:

- Argues for preserving formal programs of explicit civic education, which eventually will also include teaching public and social accountability through CRE in public schools.
- Identifies reasons behind the failures of implemented policy measures to create a culture of intolerance towards irresponsible behavior of public authorities.
- Identifies teachings in Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy that are compatible with the modern notion of public and social accountability and accordingly tries to ground its underlying principles in the message of these religious traditions.
- Identifies the most important areas for policy intervention such as: anti-corruption strategies and programs aiming at raising social awareness about the issue of public accountability, the revision of CRE curricula and textbooks, improvement of teaching methods, CRE teachers' training, and simultaneous cooperation with civil sector, RCs and international community organizations in all these activities.
- Proposes measures to be taken in order to reduce or eliminate existing deficiencies in the current CRE model, thus creating a better model that will satisfy both the still undisputable eagerness and sacred mission of RCs to contribute to the wellbeing of BH society, as well as the aim of educational and other relevant public authorities to create civic morality among the youth urging them to demand accountable and good governance from their representatives.

In other words, this study will provide policy makers with information and analysis to assist them in formulating and implementing comprehensive civic education policies that will engage "social and spiritual capital" of CRE for the benefit of creating a cultural environment more conducive for positive changes in the institution of public accountability. The building of civic culture is time demanding but probably an inevitable step in establishing the institution of public

accountability, which requires support from all influential societal forces. This includes religion and RCs, whose positive educational potentials in this regard so far have been understated and understudied. Here we would like to make a difference, and to put the whole discussion in a wider social and comparative perspective. We propose the following hypothesis to guide this research: *Despite the obvious failure of CRE in primary schools in BH to employ relevant religious teachings to promote principles of good governance and active citizenship, CRE could be constructively used to educate the youngest generations about the meaning and importance of public and social accountability in their religion, thus preparing them for life in society based on participative democracy.* Such capacities of religion and CRE education are rarely acknowledged and largely underutilized. The reason might be in the prevailing image of religion as a “destructive social force”. Because of the failure to see religion and CRE from a more positive perspective we often do not notice that such cooperative programs might present a good opportunity for inducing desirable and positive change and developments inside RCs themselves. Although RCs are influential actors in BH society, like any other social organizations they are also under permanent threat to succumb to practices that contravene ideals of accountability. Therefore, such programs provide channels for indirectly placing “positive pressure” on RCs to implement their own ideals of accountability and thus reduce the potential “credibility gap”.

## 1.2. Methodology and Limitations

The analysis of the issue under our consideration will take into account the following *situational variables*: cultural legacy of past autocratic regimes, economic and existential problems facing BH citizens, deficiencies in local civil sector, current status of civic education and CRE in public schools, legal status and social weight of religion and RCs, institutional discontinuity in BH, modern standards for civic education and the role of religion in the process, and notions of public and social accountability in Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. The following *policy variables* will be considered: content (curriculum/textbooks) of religious education in public schools, people involved (teachers and their education), implementation and teaching methods. The primary focus will be on textbooks. To test the hypothesis we will do the following: Conduct content analysis of the textbooks of civic education at public schools in order to establish a benchmark for teaching citizenship culture of public accountability.

- Compare our findings with textbooks currently used for CRE at primary schools in BH.
- Interview any of the following individuals to supplement this data and clarify and test preliminary conclusions: representatives of RCs, relevant NGO activists, and officials at respective educational ministries and anti-corruption agencies and bodies.
- Review relevant reports and literature on characteristics of citizenship culture in BH and its respective historical, socio-political and economic background, the status of CRE and civic education in public schools as well as that of religion and RCs in BH society, literature discussing the notion of public accountability in Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, anti-corruption strategies and programs, legislation, documents, speeches, official statements, media coverage, international reports, and similar materials to set the stage for the discussion and put the whole issue into perspective.

Now we will look at how current policy generally failed to develop a robust civic culture of public and social accountability, the causes and social implications of the failure, how to engage religion and CRE in this campaign, and stakeholders involved in the process. Next, we



will suggest and discuss policy options in light of the analytical framework that we will adopt in this study. The advantages and disadvantages of defined policy options will be discussed, and the justification for the selected option will be explained in detail. Accordingly, we will draw conclusions and make recommendations for all major actors, including government, RCs, international and local organizations.

## 2. Problem Description

### 2.1. Current Nature and Background of the Problem

At the heart of the Bosnian governance problem – from social policy to natural resource management, from rural development policy to debates over the most appropriate way to spend scarce education resources – lies the lack of engagement of Bosnian citizens and interest groups in the practice of government. Just as a company without the interest of an owner will not use its assets wisely, public institutions which are not subject to constant pressure from citizens exerted through the democratic process will not respond to the needs of the public effectively (European Stability Initiative, 2004: 51).

The robust civil society and active political participation of ordinary citizens are usually referred to as one of the four so called “pillars of democracy” (Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006), without which stability and effectiveness of democratic political order would be seriously endangered (Šalaj, 2005). The main purpose of informed and active citizenship in the practice of governance is to provide broader societal support and control for public decisions that should be made in the line with established laws and rules of conduct, and according to the needs and in the best interest of citizens. This would protect them from arbitrary decisions and irresponsible behavior of power holders and public officers and create a situation whereby every unaccountable behavior on the part of public authorities would be “a highly risky activity, faced with strong social contempt and slim chances to go undetected” (Blagovčanin, 2009: 15) and unreported by wider society. At the core of such public activism is a specific skill set of political knowledge, values and practice, or simply civic culture, regarding the institution of public accountability that informs and determines expected standards of behavior on the part of public officials or criteria of vertical accountability. This skill set also produces broader societal constituency for horizontal accountability innovations (Fox, 2000), creates necessary psychocultural impetus for social accountability of ordinary citizens (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004), and eventually informs and shapes personal ethics of conduct in public service as many ordinary citizens end up working as public officers. In the absence of such a culture, consequent modes of governance, almost without exception, become a fulfillment of Hobbes’ old saying that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” as many empirical studies point to a negative relationship between underdeveloped civic culture and good governance (Treisman, 2000 in Datzer, 2009; Andrews, 2007). Paradoxical as it may be, the above quoted statement taken from the report of European Stability Initiative for 2004, however, convincingly shows that BH public institutions have fallen victim to unaccountability and corruption greatly due to a deficient civic participation in the practice of governance.

According to the latest reports and analysis, the prevailing attitude of ordinary people in BH towards various particularistic forms of behavior in governance could be best described as a “culture of tolerance” (Datzer, 2009), which is very often characterized by full awareness about

widespread presence of corruption in the public institutions and its damage (Datzer, 2009) but accompanied by misunderstanding of notions of a citizen and democracy (Hodžić, 2003). It also includes a strong sense of apathy and helplessness in regard to active civic participation and the possibility of change (Korjenić, 2006), and can even attempt to provide different justifications for such misconduct on the part of public officers and ordinary people (Lazić and Kolundžija, 2005), or a readiness to get involved in such acts under specific circumstances (Datzer, 2009).

Accordingly, a study conducted by UNDP (2003) showed that citizens ranked impartiality among the most important characteristics of good governance, while the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International (2007) found that BH citizens see political parties as the most corrupt, whereby 2 out of each 3 study participants considered anti-corruption activities of the government as ineffective, while almost 70% of them predicted spreading of corruptive behavior in the next three years. Similarly, the earlier Corruption Perception Study (2004) by the same organization showed that 2/3 of the subjects saw corruption as a harmful social phenomenon, while correctly labeling different corruptive forms of behavior as its observable manifestations. However, relevant analysis shows that BH citizens sometimes have a one-sided, superficial and stereotypic understanding of active citizenship and democracy, associating them with attempts of atheization and religious indifference, or with the passive declaration of civic orientation that, nevertheless, disrespectfully looks upon every kind of political engagement (Hodžić, 2003). The following report of a NGO representative about her experience with promoting civic activism in BH is revealing in this regard:

People on the street do not know what NGO is. They think it is opposition to the government or something humanitarian. They don't know capacities and don't understand potentials of the NGO sector. All these people do not understand that they too can initiate their own activities, which are related to their own problems. Citizens don't think of themselves as actors [of political and social change] (Maglajlić and Hodžić, 2006).

Although the number of NGOs is very often used as an indicator of vigilant civic culture in a country (Hadžić and Maglajlić, 2006), its validity in the case of BH should be considered with caution as their quantity simply does not correspond to the level of active civic participation among BH citizens (Sali-Terzić, 2001). According to the latest estimates, there are around 5000 active NGOs in BH, with only a portion of them being directly interested in promoting principles and values of good governance. However, the last report about citizenship participation in governance in BH, annually prepared by the Civic Initiatives Centers (CIC, 2010), says that its quality is at the lowest level since 2006. Although interviewed citizens usually recognize local communities (LC) and citizenship meetings (CM) as mechanisms for civic participation, only 34% of the interviewed, for example, have experience of civic participation through the LCs and 25% of them gained such experience through the CMs. Only 16,9% of the interviewed are members of a NGO, while 20,7% have consulted government representatives in regard to some problem or proposal. Similarly, in its report about citizenship participation in BH for 2007, CIC found that 40% of interviewed subjects justified their disengagement in the public decision making process by lack of interest (CIC, 2007). Uncertainty of the interviewed people about principles and mechanisms of active citizenship probably could be best understood from the finding that 83,5% of them actually do not have an answer to the question about the main reasons for not potentially answering the government calls to participate in the process of planning or decision making (CIC, 2010). Similarly, many BH citizens have a view that corruption is so deeply rooted in the government and society that no reaction of civil sector can





eliminate it (Maljević, et.al, 2006, in Datzer, 2009). Altogether, these findings are symptomatic of a widespread sense of political apathy and pessimism among BH citizens that hardly can motivate them to insist on public accountability.

Furthermore, recent studies have shown that people in BH are sometimes even ready to justify corruptive behaviors that go against the underlying principles of public accountability as an “unavoidable part of tradition”, “general culture”, simply “part of us”, a “token of appreciation”, “a way of showing respect towards certain professions” (Lazić and Kolundžija, 2005), or a “necessary evil” (Datzer, 2009) or even express readiness to get involved in corruptive transactions and behaviors. In this sense, the mentioned Corruption Perception Study (2004) found that 20% of those interviewed believed that corruption has always been present; that one out of every ten participants believed that everybody was practicing corruption and that nothing is wrong about it in order to solve one’s daily problems; that one out of every four citizens was ready to offer a bribe for counter-service or in return for a privileged position or achieving his/her rights; that one out of every five interviewed subjects was ready to accept a bribe if offered; and that more than a third of those questioned think that only those accepting bribes should be punished and not those who are offering it. Later findings that citizens rank cultural and moral crisis as the second most important cause of corruption in BH (Lazić and Kolundžija, 2005) additionally points to the seriousness of the problem.

The current status of the civic culture of public accountability among BH citizens is a result of the prolonged and systematic influence exercised by different socio-political factors over their collective consciousness through channels of formal, non-formal and informal education over time. Accordingly, the causes of existing deficiencies in social awareness and attitude towards public accountability should be looked for in 1) the cultural legacy of past autocratic regimes, most notably communism (Xharra, 2010), 2) the subsequent experience of the war, 3) the weakness of local civil sector organizations (Maglajić and Hodžić, 2006; Valha, 2009) and 4) the inert attitude of post-war government institutions towards possibilities of formal and non-formal civic socialization (Šalaj, 2002 and 2005). All these factors in their specific ways have undermined proper functioning of formal, non-formal and informal channels responsible for the development of participatory civic culture of public accountability among BH citizens.

In the last two decades BH society has witnessed a transition from an autocratic political order to a democratic one. While the latter made active citizenship condition *sine quo non* for its very functioning, the former *de facto* discouraged citizenship participation in public governance through its influence on all factors of political socialization, including RCs. During the rule of communist regime, BH citizens experienced little of authentic civil society similar to that of Western Europe since such modes of civic participation were intrinsically incompatible with the ruling political system. Accordingly, the state ideology and the one-party system purposively extended their influence to all actors of formal, non-formal and informal political socialization (Bodružić, 2010), thus purposively creating a legal and cultural climate conducive to developing a social mentality probably best described as “servant political culture” that could not nor should not provide psycho-cultural impetus for active citizenship engagement in questioning government policies and practice. Although sport and cultural organizations did exist, for example, they were either apolitical or their engagement in political and governance processes usually reflected the interests of the ruling communist party. Similarly, although under the principle of “self-management” the system was greatly decentralized and allowed its citizens more freedom and control of their own affairs, such as limited private ownership of property and businesses and travel abroad, the system overall remained totalitarian and freedom did not extend to informed and ac-

tive civic participation in matters of politics and governance. In addition, party organs controlled the media, while unions protected the interests of the party rather than those of the workers. Potential criticisms of the state, public authorities or revolution, including jokes, were considered as “verbal attacks” on the government and were punishable by law (Bodružić, 2010). Eventually, the controlling influence of the communist regime was also extended to the activities of RCs, pushing religion into the margins of social life and reducing it to the matter of personal consciousness. Public education did not provide space for CRE within the walls of state schools. Such possibility was granted only to religious schools responsible for training Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Muslim clergy and to confessional programs inside mosques and parishes, even though they too were closely watched and controlled by the system. Any potential critique of political and public order on a religious basis would have been understood as an attack on the state and would have deserved a prompt and severe reaction.

Furthermore, the aggression against the Republic of BH and consequent war in different ways undermined the efforts in developing the nascent civil society, active citizenship and democracy. First, it focused the attention of people on bare survival, while its destructions brought prolonged economic crisis that will, to a large extent, turn the attention of people to existential concerns even during many years to come (Hopken, 2010). Second, foreign humanitarian aid somewhat fed into the “mentality of dependence” among many local people for solutions to their own problems – a life attitude which had already developed during communist rule – thus discouraging a proactive attitude of citizens so much needed for the proper functioning of the newly arrived political order. Finally, the war divided BH society along ethnic lines and profoundly severed bonds of cross-ethnic social trust, ensuring that in the post-war country active citizenship participation would be largely possible only within the boundaries of particular ethnic identities and interests (Datzer, 2009; Valha, 2009). As a result, many CSO organizations ended up as associations that gathered members of one ethnic group so that attempts to practice social accountability in the face of irresponsible behavior of public officers belonging to some other ethnicity could be easily rejected as attacks based on the interests of the organization’s own ethnic group.

In addition, CSOs serving as the main non-formal channel for promoting ideas and values of participative democracy remained to be largely underdeveloped, weak, uncoordinated and fragmented (Maglajić and Hodžić, 2006), often missing devotion to their mission and not being able to fully carry out the responsibility of teaching active citizenship (Valha, 2009). In this sense, although organizations of civil society established prior to the war managed to introduce ideas of active citizenship in urban society, they were unable to gain significant popular support in the short time before the war. This was especially true in the segregated and undereducated rural areas outside major cities (Bodružić, 2010), which made any potential idea of active citizenship a largely urban and elitist phenomenon (Maglajić and Hodžić, 2006). The aggression decimated organizations of this fledgling civil society. In Tuzla, for instance, the initial number of some 800 citizen associations prior to the war fell to 44 by its end (Sali-Terzić, 2001). The war also largely determined their agenda, reducing it to humanitarian aid, psycho-social rehabilitation of the war victims and post-war reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure (Sali-Terzić, 2001), while activities aiming at non-formal civic education in most cases were postponed for the late nineties (Korjenić, 2006). Furthermore, flourishing civil organizations very often degenerated into “donor-driven” associations primarily led by the urge to preserve the organization and not by the sense of mission. Without intrinsic motivation and enthusiasm they were sentenced to failure in transferring the ideals of public accountability and attitude of social accountability to BH citizens (Valha, 2009). Now, like then after the war, communication and coordination between civil sector organizations



in regard to their activities promoting a participatory civic culture of public accountability remain to be defective because their overall functioning and performance seem to be largely fragmented (Kešić, personal communication, 2010; Korjenić, 2006). Some of these remarks are equally valid for RCs in BH too, whose post-war activities either mostly addressed purely confessional and pressing humanitarian needs of respective congregations or followed the ethno-religious principle in teaching about political socialization. In addition, after the war RCs largely resembled other NGOs in BH in the way they cooperated with other organizations of the civil sector in promoting civic culture of public accountability (Kešić, interview, 2010). In any case, citizenship education on the basis of civic identity could hardly find a partner in such post-war religious discourse in BH.

Finally, like in many other post-communist countries (Šalaj, 2002), BH – faced with the sheer absence of civic culture that would uphold a new democratic political order – after the war had to consider introducing programs for appropriate political socialization in different levels of formal education. This process, however, was very slow and often lacking strong support of the political authorities in power at the time. The first three anti-corruption strategies, for instance, did not include measures aiming at raising social awareness about the problem of corruption and the meaning of public accountability whatsoever, not to mention any inclusion of RCs and religious education in the campaign. Instead, they focused on adopting legislation and building institutional capacities necessary for fighting corruptive behaviors (Blagovčanin, 2009) without giving much space to a preventive approach through promoting active citizenship participation in fighting the malpractice. Such attitudes of public authorities towards the issue of democratic political socialization of BH people in the context of the anti-corruption struggle had direct consequence for the pace of introducing civic education in the formal school system. In 1997, for example, teachers from the Republika Srpska (RS) were secretly attending the first joint training for future teachers of citizenship education and democracy organized by the Education Center for Democracy and Human Rights CIVITAS BH (CIVITAS, 2010). Only in 1999 cantons following the Federation curriculum were able to introduce the course “Basics of Democracy” in the 8<sup>th</sup> grade of primary schools (CIVITAS, 2010), while the same course in the curriculum of the RS was introduced in 2008. After all education ministries in 2000 signed the Declaration of the Ministers Conference and were thus obliged to include “Democracy and Human Rights” in the official curricula for secondary schools during the 2001/2002 academic year, the course was introduced in most of BH high schools in 2001 (CIVITAS, 2010). In the same year the subject was introduced in eight universities in BH.

Previous studies have shown that adopting legislation and building institutional capacities necessary for fighting corruptive behaviors hardly bring about positive changes in reducing levels of corruption if they are not followed by their implementation and sincere devotion to the reforms (Rousso and Steves, 2008 in Datzler, 2009), which are usually brought about by pressure from civil society through implementing the principle of vertical accountability. In addition, the anti-corruption strategies previously adopted in BH have many other essential flaws (Blagovčanin, 2009), as later reports came to basically confirm their functional ineffectiveness in reducing the level of corruptive practices (Ured za monitoring i implementaciju, 2006). Altogether, low level of active civic participation as well as lack of interest in the practice of governance observed in the past among BH citizens, as outlined and explained at the beginning of the paper, have been a natural result of lasting deficiencies in the social and institutional environments that otherwise should nourish citizenship culture of public and social accountability.

Now we turn to the current institutional and socio-political environment in which the civic culture of public accountability in BH is embedded.

## 2.2. The Problem within Its Current Policy Environment

For one to adequately outline and understand policy and the socio-political context surrounding the issue of a civic culture of public accountability in BH, the following variables seem to be crucial: 1) the latest anti-corruption strategy adopted by the Agency for Preventing Corruption and Coordinating Fight against Corruption (APCCC), 2) the ongoing programs of formal civic education in BH schools and their legal framework, 3) the activities of respective NGOs aiming at non-formal teaching about participative democracy and active citizenship, 4) the economic situation in the country and attitude of suspicion among people towards new, imported ideas and 5) the position of political parties in this regard.

The 4<sup>th</sup> and latest anti-corruption strategy from 2009, this time adopted by the newly established APCCC, represents a good starting point for understanding the current policy environment of citizenship education in the fight against corruption in public sector. Unlike the first three, this strategy has called for raising social awareness about the problem through cooperation with all relevant social and educational institutions (APCCC, 2009), as had been suggested earlier by several respective NGOs (Blagovčanin, 2009). The strategy, therefore, has called for a preventive, comprehensive and coordinated approach to the struggle against corruption, aiming – among other objectives – to include the entire society in the campaign through coordinated programs and activities of formal and non-formal education about the meaning of good governance, its basic principles, harm that corruptive behavior brings to the society, and about the need for active civic involvement in pressuring for vertical accountability of public authorities (APCCC, 2009). In other words, creating a civic culture of active intolerance towards different forms of unaccountable behavior on the part of public servants has finally become one of the main priorities for the anti-corruption bodies and agencies. Accordingly, the measures suggested in the strategy included introducing a course on ethics and the struggle against corruption at all levels of formal education. Additionally, there would be cooperation with media and relevant NGOs as channels of non-formal teaching about the values of participatory civic culture of public accountability as a necessary measure in creating a social environment where instances of irresponsible and corruptive behavior will not go unrecognized, undetected or unpunished by the broader society. However, in the strategy there is no reference to any possible constructive role of RCs and CRE in the campaign whatsoever (APCCC, 2009).

As rightly observed in the latest monitoring report about its implementation (Transparency International, 2010), the strategy is characterized by “insufficient awareness of the local context” (p. 8) and of developments already achieved in teaching about active citizenship and democracy. Be that as it may, the implementation of the strategy measures aiming at formal civic education and raising of social awareness about the problem has not started yet due to delay in staffing of the Agency (Transparency International, 2010). However, even once the program is started the APCCC will need to take into account different policy measures already implemented through formal education to tackle the problem of deficient civic culture as well as specific legal, social, and political context surrounding the issue.

Mainly thanks to the persisting efforts of CIVITAS BH in training future teachers and developing curricula and textbooks are courses of citizenship education currently taught at all levels of formal education in the country. Thus, civic education in the first four grades of primary school is taught as a cross-curricular course. During advanced years it is implemented either through a separate subject in 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> grade according to curricula in Bosnian language, or in 6<sup>th</sup> grade



in schools following curricula in Serbian language, or during the hour of Classroom Meeting in the case of schools implementing curricula in Croatian language (Kešić, personal communication, 2010). These two ways of political education have been known as an *interdisciplinary approach* and a *separate subject model*, and have proved to be the most effective mechanism in teaching about democracy and active citizenship (Šalaj, 2002). These two approaches could be commonly designated as model of explicit civic education, whereby teaching civic values is an integral part of formal curriculum either through a separate subject or through course devoted to broader social education, including selected political topics. Furthermore, in high schools following curricula in Bosnian and Serbian languages the course entitled “Democracy and Human Rights” is taught as a separate two-semester subject in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> grade, while in the schools with curricula in Croatian language the lessons on democracy are included in the course on “Politics and Economy, Democracy and Human Rights” (Demokratija i ljudska prava, no date; CIVITAS, 2010; Kešić, personal communication, 2010). At the level of higher education the course entitled “Democracy and Human Rights” is offered at eight BH universities either as a compulsory or elective undergraduate or postgraduate subject (CIVITAS, 2010).

However, after the eventual success in introducing civic education in elementary schools either as a cross curricular or as a discrete course, formal citizenship education in the Federation has witnessed a serious drawback in 2006 as the respective Ministry of Education excluded this course from the new “Nine Years Program for Primary Schools”. The Federal Ministry claims that the decision was made on the suggestion and with the approval of respective canton ministers and in the best interest of pupils who are already too burdened with the currently overcrowded curriculum (Bandić, personal communication, 2011). The decision to remove the subject is also justified on the ground that its content will be adequately incorporated in other courses (Kešić, personal communication, 2010). That claim, however, cannot be proven from the respective curricula. This discrepancy in the Ministry is clarified by the explanation that they rather meant that “the spirit” of educating for democracy and active citizenship will be permeating the organization and teaching activities of the school and that teachers of other subjects will be responsible for adjusting their lesson units in order to serve this function without, however, specifically and explicitly treating political and civic themes as separate sub-titles (Bandić, personal communication, 2011). These approaches to political education are known as the *model of hidden curriculum* and the *model of education principle* respectively (Šalaj, 2002), and they commonly could be referred to as model of implicit civic education. By doing this the Federation Ministry has actually gone against the widely accepted practice in most EU countries of teaching civics and democratic culture through a separate subject. Empirical studies have shown that this method represents a significantly more effective way of political socialization and developing citizenship culture than the above mentioned models (Šalaj, 2002 and 2005). This measure also does not take into consideration the results of a recent study conducted on a sample of 301 secondary schools in BH, which found that 64,7% of the interviewed students are satisfied with the subject content, 79,3% of them are satisfied with the teacher approach, 62,1% are satisfied with the textbook, and more than half of the interviewed students are more satisfied with this course than with any other curriculum subject (Džidić and Spajić-Vrkaš, 2011). Implementation of this policy in the Federation, eventually, also means further disharmonization of civic education in BH, as the educational authorities in the RS stick to the interdisciplinary approach and separate subject model in teaching democracy and citizenship in primary schools.

In addition, during the last ten years various NGOs have been especially active in educating about the importance of active civic engagement in the practice of governance within the con-

text of creating and maintaining an institution of public accountability. CIVITAS BH, Transparency International BH, the Civic Initiatives Center – to mention some of the most vigorous civil organizations in this regard – have been implementing various programs of non-formal education about principles of accountable and good governance as well as about meaning, skills and values of active citizenship in the struggle against corruption and other forms of irresponsible behavior on the part of public servants. Apart from its contribution in introducing courses of citizenship in the formal education system, CIVITAS BH, for instance, for last 14 years has been active in promoting participative democracy through various publications, training programs, seminars, workshops, practical projects, policy studies, and radio and TV emissions (CIVITAS, 2010). Transparency International BH within its “Public Awareness Campaign” ([www.ti-bih.org](http://www.ti-bih.org)) along with the Civic Initiatives Centers ([www.cci.ba](http://www.cci.ba)) and other similar NGOs have been intensively advocating for transparency and accountability in public administration as well as promoting the importance of informed and active civic engagement in governance.

Furthermore, even today, 16 years after the end of war, BH is suffering from a serious economic crisis in which – paradoxically as it may be – people are seemingly more concerned with existential issues than with insisting on accountability of those responsible for their status. Also, they seem to be suspicious towards foreign ideas that have been increasingly imported from – in their perception – foreign countries and cultures, which contradict their traditional values and that have not brought economic prosperity whatsoever (Hadžić, 2003). Democracy for them is only one of these “new ideas and values” whose arrival coincides with the war and economic turmoil in the country or resembles building supra-national identities at the expense of ethnic belonging (Alibašić, 2009).

Finally, under the prevailing ethnic system of political organizing in BH, political parties also might be reluctant to sincerely support activities and programs promoting ideas of active citizenship and participative democracy that do not follow preferably exclusive ethnic logic and their interests of civic activism. In line with this, NGOs active in exposing instances of irresponsible behavior on the part of political authorities and in promoting social accountability are very often accused for being “an extended hand” of the international community (Korjenić, 2006; Valha, 2009). In this context it should be pointed out that there is a perception in a part of BH media that local RCs also tend to grant their support to the respective ethno-national parties and authorities as well as corrupted businessmen while ignoring their irresponsibility in serving public needs (Popović, 2009). Altogether, it seems that an attitude of ruling national parties towards civic education and activism led by general public interest and not by narrow ethnic consideration might be one of decisive factors in effectively promoting principles and values of public and social accountability.

As the current level and quality of civic participation explained in the beginning of this paper show, the implemented policy measures have not succeeded in creating a robust civic culture effective in demanding accountability from the public authorities. The underlying assumption in determining the reasons for this failure is the fact that developing any form of culture is a long-term process that entails the presence of several mutually related factors including time (Datzer, 2009), consistency in policies, parallel engagement of all relevant actors of cultural socialization (Šiber, 1998), and in general a socio-economic environment that is conducive to civic participation. Accordingly, the expected results have not been achieved for several reasons. First and foremost, relevant government policies and NGO activities have been undertaken too recently in order to give their best results. The role of active citizenship in pressuring for public



accountability became an issue for policy makers basically only in the most recent strategy of the APCCC (2009), whose implementation, at least in the part concerning proposed measures aiming to raising social awareness, has not actually started yet (International Transparency, 2010). Similarly, civic education courses were introduced too late into the formal system of education throughout BH to bear fruits yet. Other institutional and socio-economic factors we mentioned here in fact have only slowed down this inevitable process of creating a firm civic culture of public accountability.

Second, as explained earlier, there has not been consistency in implementing measures of formal political education throughout BH. As previously mentioned, in some primary schools the civic education has been implemented as a separate subject during one of the advanced years, while in others it is taught only during the hour of Classroom Meeting. Additionally, in some primary schools the subject has been there since 1999 and in some only since 2008. Similar policy inconsistencies have been characteristic for teaching civic education in high schools too. And above all, formal civic education in BH is currently faced with a serious crisis that might further destabilize the status of the course in formal education (Kešić, personal communication, 2010). The reluctance of political parties towards the process signals that educational and political authorities may not be ready to grant full and unreserved support for the ongoing campaign for adequate civic socialization.

Third, many NGOs have ended up as “donor driven” organizations concerned with organizational survival and personal interest, thus losing their sense of mission and failing to transfer a sense of responsibility to citizens who easily grasp the lack of intrinsic motivation on the part of NGO activists (Valha, 2009). Similarly, NGO programs of citizenship education and training lack mutual coordination on the part of the involved NGOs (Kešić, personal communication, 2010) thus creating needless overlap.

Fourth, according to the reports of the World Bank (2003), around one fifth of the BH citizens live in poverty and many on its brinks. It is in a way paradoxical that BH citizens are concerned with existential issues to the extent that it prevents them from considering the luxury of political engagement as an opportunity to insist on accountability of the very public authorities responsible for their miserable living conditions. In addition to that, after the collapse of the former communist regime did not bring the prosperity that was enjoyed by democratic countries in the West, as was promised, part of BH people became rather suspicious about ideas coming from the western part of the world, and especially so if those ideas seemed to contradict their own worldviews. Accordingly, at least some people are nostalgic about the “good times”, invoking an appearance of an autocratic leader or political party that will bring some order into the current “democratic chaos” (Datzer, 2009). The suspicion even increases or becomes more emotionally saturated once some other BH citizens state that the idea of democracy in its totality is incompatible with their value and religious system, thus directly undermining every attempt of promoting public accountability, at least, on the ground of democratic principles. As a result, in the perception of these BH citizens, the process of civic democratization might seem equal to a campaign of atheization (Hadžić, 2003) which should be denounced and rejected.

Fifth, programs aiming at creating an authentic civic culture of public accountability, not one limited by ethnic logic, do not have the full support of leading national political parties, which has created a situation whereby public authorities should and could be held accountable only by the members of their own ethnic groups.

Finally, contradictory to the practices of relevant international organizations and the suggestions of local organizations, the current public policies as well as civic education programs of respective NGOs have failed to engage *all* relevant social institutions and forces, most notably among them religion and RCs in BH. The Agency's strategy (2009) proposes cooperation with public educational institutions in educating youth about the importance of public accountability in the struggle against corruption through respective programs but it does not refer to the possibility of engaging RCs and CRE in the campaign. Apart from the bare mentioning of RCs by respective NGOs (Milanović, 2005), occasional allusions of theologians to the issue, and public invitations of the High Representative to RCs to join the struggle against corruption (Vjerske zajednice su moralne instance, 2010), no proposal outlining Islamic and Christian understandings of public and social accountability has been made. Similarly, no suggestion of possible modalities of cooperation between RCs, the state, and NGOs in teaching about values and principles of citizenship and good governance could be identified. Modules about the relationships between democracy and Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy developed in 2006 by CIVITAS BH represent the only bright exception in this regard (CIVITAS, 2010). Although CIVITAS BH is still eager to support such cooperative projects with RCs in the context of promoting social awareness about public and social accountability in the future, the modules have not been implemented as the organization was not able to secure funds supporting the project. Also, any future proposals in this regard are expected to preferably come from RCs themselves as NGOs harbor fears of being accused for interfering in the interpretation of religious teachings (Kešić, personal communication, 2010).

### **2.3. Religious Education in Service of Active Citizenship and Public Accountability**

Engaging RCs and CRE in the process of creating a robust civic culture of public accountability definitely will not immediately solve all problems surrounding the current approach to the issue. However, in making an informed decision about this measure several facts should be considered.

First, it is in line with EU standards and practices and with the ideal of comprehensiveness of the above mentioned anti-corruption strategies. Many eminent scholars in developed democratic countries (Berger and Hefner, no date; Djupe and Gilbert, 2009) and analysts in leading development institutions (Marshall, 2004) such as the World Bank, for example, today convincingly talk about the unique strength of "social, spiritual and developmental capital" of religion. Additionally, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2005) openly recognizes religion as a significant source of positive civic values and invites using its social and spiritual capital for promoting principles of democracy (Williams, Hinge and Persson, 2008; *Teaching Democracy through Religious Education*, 2009). The Council of Europe in its recommendation 1720, for instance, expresses regrets that the role of religions in building a democratic society "has not yet received special attention" (2005, Clause 11) as many of "the values upheld by the Council of Europe stem from... values derived from Judaism, Christianity and Islam" (2005, Clause 12). In a similar fashion the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, one of the oldest and the most prominent international affairs organizations in the United States, in its recently released task force report has urged U.S. foreign policy makers to make engaging religion on an international level among their highest priorities, saying that "the success of American diplomacy in the next decade will be measured... by its ability to connect with the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world whose identity is defined by religion" (Chicago Council, 2010). As result, educational practices in democratic countries where teaching values of citizenship and democracy is com-





bined with religious education are abundant (Jackson and Steele, 2004), with Norway being the most striking case (Williams, Hinge and Persson, 2008).<sup>1</sup> Generally, two approaches to the issue have been apparent in the practice of developed democracies, namely, the Confessional and the Religious Studies approach (Jackson and Steele, 2004). The first, *Confessional* one, is primarily education *into* religion, where teaching of a single religious tradition is the exclusive right and responsibility of the representatives of the RCs that are in this endeavor assisted by the educational authorities having a clear intention to bring in pupils to the religion or strengthen their religious commitment. During the process religious teachings and values are related to modern concepts and principles of citizenship and democracy. On the contrary, in the Religious Studies approach to citizenship education, religion is taught from the outside, from a descriptive and historical perspective, whereby its Holy scripture is approached not as the sacred text but rather as a piece of literature, whose moral teachings are appropriately related to the principles and values of civic culture and democracy (Jackson and Steele, 2004).

Second, the modern notions of public and social accountability imply duty of public officials to demonstrate respect for transparency, responsibility to justify their conduct, integrity, efficiency, efficacy, accessibility to citizens and sensibility for their needs while performing public service. In regard to citizens it means their responsibility to patiently demand from their authorities to follow the above principles (Bovens, 2005; Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004; Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006). All of these qualities are compatible with the moral teachings of Islam and Christianity. In short, Islamic understanding of public and social accountability is based on four inter-connected principles, namely, vicegerency of man (*khilāfa*), the citizenship contract between the governor and the governed (*bay'a hurra*), consultation (*shūrā*), and enjoining the good and preventing what is wrong (*al-amr bil-ma'rāf wan-nahy 'anil-munkar*). Accordingly, in Islam every man is considered a vicegerent of God on earth (Qur'an, 2:30) entrusted by Him with valuable resources and responsible positions which he should accordingly use and perform. Public authorities are entrusted with the position of custodian (*rā'in*) of public property and interest as well as with the respective powers needed for successful implementation of the responsibility. In order to carry out their duty in a proper manner, public authorities are to behave in line with universal moral norms of justice (*'adāle* – Qur'an, 16:90), equity (*qist* – Qur'an, 4:135), equality (*musawāt*), moral goodness (*ihsān* – Qur'an, 16:90), professional excellence (*itqān* – Hadith of the Prophet, Sunan al-Bayhaqī), public good (*maslaha al-'amma*) and accordingly established rules of positive law. In this moral sense, holders of public offices are first and foremost answerable to God and their religious conscience for their performance, whereby in following the above norms they should behave "as if they are watching Him, because even if they do not see Him, He surely sees them" (Hadith of the Prophet, *Sahīh al-Muslim*). Because of the implicit contract of mutual allegiances and rights (*bay'a*) between the governor and the governed, state authorities as custodians of public property and their interests are also obliged to ask for council of learnt men and experts in regard to decisions and actions pertaining to the public matters. They also should seek the opinion of the broader society since consultation (*shūrā*) is a principle strictly respected by good believers in discussing public matters (Qur'an, 42:38), asked even from the Prophet himself (Qur'an, 3:159) and practiced by the Pious Caliphs, whose behavior should represent ideals to be cherished and modeled by Muslims in all times and places. On the other side, in Islam the knowledgeable ones and the community are under moral and religious obligation to give their informed opinion (*shūrā*) and good minded council (*nasīha*) to their superiors, speak out their views in front of them and watchfully supervise (*muhāsaba*, *murāqaba*) their actions in order to make sure they are made in line with the law, ethical norms and in the best interest of the society.

<sup>1</sup> Attempts of relating religious tradition to values of citizenship and democracy probably could be found in many post-communist and post-autocratic countries which share a history of non-democratic regimes and consequently an absence of democratic culture. Arab-Muslim countries in the Middle East are good examples where on-going democratization efforts see in Islamic teachings fertile ground for development of civic culture (Center for Study of Islam and Democracy, 2005, 2007).

Otherwise, they might risk losing the privilege of belonging to “the best community” (*khayr umma*– Qur’an, 3:110) described as those who are “enjoining the good and preventing what is wrong” (*ta’murūna bil-ma’rūfi wa tanhawna ‘anil-munkar*– Qur’an, 3:110). This would be betraying the Islamic ideals of peaceful and positive social activism (*jihād*) firmly established in the sacred text of the Qur’an and in the practice of the Prophet (s.a.v.s) and the first and best generation of Muslims. For sincere Muslims corruption in its various forms by definition means betrayal of the above mentioned principles of moral conduct as well as endangering public interest, and so such attitudes on the part of governors represents breaching the vicegerency covenant (*khilāfa*) with God and the contract of mutual allegiance and responsibilities (*bay’a*) with the governed. In face of such attitude by power holders, Muslim men and women in line with the ideal of “enjoining the good and preventing what is wrong” (*ta’murūna bil-ma’rūfi wa tanhawna ‘anil-munkar*) are religiously obliged to react through the means of positive and peaceful ethical activism and struggle (*jihād*).

The standpoint of the Catholic Church in regard to the issue of corruption and public accountability similarly has been expressed in two of its documents, namely “Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church” (2004) and “Fight against Corruption” (2006) both issued by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Accordingly, the Church condemns corruption as a practice standing in radical contrast to all fundamental principles of Catholic social doctrine, including: the dignity of the human person, the common good, solidarity, subsidiarity, the preferential option for the poor and the universal destination of goods (Compendium, 2004). In this sense, it is the viewpoint of the Church that corruption:

...Exploits the human person, disdainfully using men and women for selfish interests. It represents an obstacle for achieving the common good, because it is based on individualistic criteria of selfish cynicism and illicit special interests. It is a contradiction of solidarity because it gives rise to injustice and poverty, and a contradiction of subsidiarity because it does not respect the different social and institutional roles but corrupts them. It also acts against the preferential option for the poor by hindering the proper delivery to the poor of the resources intended for them. Finally, it stands in contrast to the universal destination of goods because the good of legality, as we have already seen, is a human good for every man and woman, intended for all people (Fight against Corruption, 2006).

In line with its conviction that corruption is embedded in social and cultural environments conducive to such malpractice, the Catholic Church proposes the concept of “human ecology” as a solution for the problem, thus offering a perspective of social relationships that is completely incompatible with the practice of corruption whereby all social institutions will be engaged in moral education and the formation of responsible citizens. The contribution of the Church in this regard is envisaged as “the entire body of her social doctrine and the work of those who are inspired by it” (Fight against Corruption, 2006). Eventually, in its support for institutions of public and social accountability and enculturation of their underlying principles, the Pontifical document on corruption states that:

The fight against corruption requires a greater conviction, by means of the consensus given to moral evidence, and a greater awareness that this fight will provide important social advantages. According to the teaching of human ecology “Man tends towards good, but he is also capable of evil. He can transcend his immediate interest and still remain bound to it. The social order will be all the more stable, the more it takes this fact into



account and does not place in opposition personal interest and the interests of society as a whole, but rather seeks ways to bring them into fruitful harmony" (Compendium, 2004, no. 25). This is a very effective and realistic criterion. It tells us to aim at the characteristics of virtuous behavior in men and women, and also to encourage these characteristics; to think of the fight against corruption as a value, and also as a need; that corruption is an evil, and that it also involves a great price; that rejecting corruption is a good, and also an advantage; that abandoning corrupt practices can lead to development and well-being; that behavior marked by honesty is to be encouraged and behavior marked by dishonesty is to be punished. In the fight against corruption it is very important that responsibility for illicit acts be exposed, that the guilty be punished with reparative measures aimed at restoring socially responsible behavior (Fight against Corruption, 2006).

As for Eastern Orthodox Christianity, like in Islamic political theory, public goods are ultimately considered property of God entrusted to government authorities, which accordingly represent only caterers (*ekonom*) of His trust. It is the responsibility of both the governor and the governed to approach this issue in line with basic social principles of Eastern Christianity, most notably among them, sacredness (*svetost*), obedience (*poslušnost*), and martyrdom (*mučeništvo*). The notion of sacredness implies compliance with God's will and moral injunctions, including the principle of love, rule of law, division of powers and the principle of electivity (*izbornost*). All of which were means used by the Church administration itself to protect people from evil will (*zla volja*), immorality, injustice and biasness of others, including the ruling elite. The governed are obliged to practice obedience (*poslušnost*) towards the governor in so far as they practice obedience (*poslušnost*) to the above moral principles as the expression of God's will. Civic disobedience to the authorities due to their breaching of the Christian ethical principles or demands of people to do so are equal to martyrdom (*mučeništvo*).<sup>2</sup>

Third, given their symbolic, moral and organizational resources, it is generally accepted that religion and RCs stand for one of the most influential social institutions in terms of their ability to shape the individual and social culture of people and motivate their actions (Appleby, 2000). Traditional religions and RCs in BH are not exceptions in this regard, as the available findings confirm that today the majority of BH youth from all religious groups express high level of religious identification (Smajić, 2010) as result of the revival religions experienced after the collapse of communism. Importantly, the very mentioning of the phrase "religion and the public sphere" in BH today brings tension, while RCs in BH are sometimes called out by the media for their silence over the problem of corruption and even accused for (in)directly backing corrupted politicians, businessmen and criminals (Popović, 2009). However, findings of recent studies (Dedić, 2009; Šalaj, 2009) show that RCs in BH are the most trusted social institutions in the country because they represent a good "entry point" for promoting public and social accountability among citizens. All these remarks are especially valuable for BH policy makers as the existing BH legal framework allows for cooperation between the state and RCs in matters of "mutual interest" (Zakon o slobodi vjere, 2004; Alibašić, ed., 2007). Representatives of state anti-corruption bodies also welcome such engagement of RCs (Jahić, 2011, personal communication) and so CRE could then become a valuable avenue for cooperation between state agencies and RCs in promoting a culture of public and social accountability.

As for its status in public schools, over a decade and a half CRE has gained the stature of a well established subject, which despite periodical critiques coming from some political parties, intellectuals and NGOs, and irrespective of its different and changing status in various parts

<sup>2</sup> A more comprehensive elaboration of Islamic, Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theories of public and social accountability goes beyond the basic purpose of the paper. For more information on the issue one, however, should look in the following literature and websites: Esposito and Voll, 1996; The European Council of Fatwa and Research; Bigović, 2000; Iqbal and Lewis, 2002; Centre for Study of Islam and Democracy, 2005, 2007, 2007; Lehman, 2004; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004 and 2006; Islamic Relief, 2009; Sulaiman, 2009.

of the country, today enjoys strong approval of students and their parents (Alibašić, 2009; Kuburić and Moe 2006). In different cantons of the Federation CRE today has a status either of an elective or compulsory course in primary and secondary schools. In the RS it is a compulsory subject in primary schools, while in District Brčko it is an optional one, only taught at primary level. Throughout the country there is a general tendency to limit the number of hours to one hour per week in secondary schools and one or two hours in primary schools (Jabučar, no date). Under the current legal arrangement, it is, however, the responsibility of RCs to draw up CRE curricula and write respective textbooks both of which are later subjected to the formal approval of the education ministries as well as to certify the teachers that are to be hired afterwards and paid for by the school authorities (Alibašić, 2009).

The presence of religion and RCs in the public square as well as the latter's discourse in this context have been a constant issue in the public debates in post-war BH, whereby RCs – among other things – have been criticized for interfering in politics (Nurikić, 2010), forcing a religious revival of BH society (Kristić, 2009a and 2009b; Begović, 2010), having irrelevant religious discourse for daily and existential issues of ordinary people (Kristić, 2009b), and ignoring attitude towards corruptive behaviors among ethno-national political elites, public authorities and businessmen (Kristić, 2009b). As for CRE, its teaching in BH public schools was periodically criticized too, albeit on the grounds that it is reinforcing segregation and ethnic divisions, discriminating against minorities, infringing on the principle of secularity (Alibašić, 2009) and that it represents “forced religious revival” of BH society, (Kristić, 2009a). This eventually has led to calls for replacing CRE with the non-confessional subject on Culture of Religions already taught but only in a small number of secondary schools in BH (Alibašić, 2009).

These and similar accusations have brought about strong reactions from RCs and their representatives in the sense that discussing political issues is their legal right as well as moral and civic responsibility as BH citizens (Tucaković, 2011). Many in RCs feel that politics should actually be treated as a public good and a principle of daily life (Topić, 2010) and additionally that religious identities should not be suppressed but appropriately expressed and accepted for the satisfaction of all people. According to some, RCs are waiting for the public to finally make up its mind whether it wants RCs to participate in the struggle against various social evils, including corruption among political and public authorities or not. However, such participation would only be possible without the imminent threat of public accusation that RCs are interfering in politics (Hodžić, 2008). As for CRE, in RCs argue that the present status cannot be corrected by making minority discriminate against majority and that the overwhelming majority of European countries have CRE irrespective of their multi-religious nature (Alibašić, 2009). Also, religious authorities have repeatedly suggested that CRE can and does contribute to the moral development of children without, however, backing up their claims with relevant statistics (Alibašić, 2009). Here, it also should be noted that after 40 years of the suppression and forced social marginalization of religion and RCs by the communist regime, it is in line with the principle and metaphor of a “suppressed spring” that such a zealous attitude in preaching religion on the part of RCs is actually a natural reaction of a suppressed people who have eventually experienced the luxury of a free and open society. Similarly, religious and cultural socialization do not take place in a historical socio-political vacuum devoid from the negative influence of cultural heritage of the past and other cultural forces of the present. Careful analysis of speeches made by Rais al-žUlama' of the Islamic Community in BH (web-page of the Islamic Community, [www.rijaset.ba](http://www.rijaset.ba)) on the occasion of žld ceremonies as well as documents of the Catholic Church (Sveta Stolica o borbi protiv korupcije, 2006) also point to the fact that RCs are indeed eager to condemn corruptive behavior in



its different forms. In conclusion, as far as engagement of RCs in the public square is concerned, it seems that religious representatives have found themselves in the middle between calls from secular intellectuals and politicians not to breach the principle of secularity (Muminović, 2009; Nurikić, 2010) on the one side, and urging by progressive theologians (Kristić, 2009a and 2009b; Begović, 2010) to more constructively and intensively engage in daily issues such as corruption of politicians and public authorities, on the other side.

Finally, the content of CRE textbooks has been criticized on several grounds, including that it does not prepare pupils for life in a plural society based on the principles of participative democracy and rule of law. This drew the attention of policy makers to the need for more social contextualization in teaching religion through CRE (Trbić, ed., 2007; Trbić and Kojić-Hasanagić, 2007) with the latest conclusion being generally approved and declaratively accepted by representatives of RCs in BH (Alibašić, 2009). The research scope and results of these and similar reports, however, have been largely focused on the role of CRE in addressing the issue of ethno-religious plurality in BH, while educating for public accountability and active citizenship has received no special attention. Nevertheless, our comparative analysis of textbooks of CRE and civic education – to which we will return to in the section on policy options – has shown that the above remark in regard to more socially contextualized CRE in the schools is equally applicable for teaching civic culture of public and social accountability. To our best knowledge, the issue of whether CRE has or might have a constructive role in bringing about positive changes in the current citizenship culture of young BH generations and their active participation in demanding accountability from public authorities has not been specifically debated in public nor initiated in relevant public policies. The above mentioned initiative of CIVITAS BH probably came closest in this regard, with no other similar attempts and proposals by BH authorities or NGOs. In this way policy makers have actually failed to recognize the compatibility between the moral teachings of Islam and Christianity and principles of public and social accountability. They have also failed to acknowledge relevant educational tendencies strongly present in developed democratic countries to purposively employ religious motivation and CRE in promoting values of active citizenship in demanding accountability from public servants. This also would indirectly place “positive pressure” on RCs in BH to abide by their own principles of accountability and consequently reduce any potential “credibility gap” in their public discourse. This paper proposes a different perspective on the role of CRE in teaching about public and social accountability and tries to initiate discussion and make respective proposals for public policies in this regard. We now will look at available policy alternatives as well as their advantages and disadvantages.

### **3. Policy Options**

#### **3.1. Possible Policy Options**

As explained in an earlier section, civic culture and participation represent an inevitable precondition of good governance. Similarly, it was shown that the underlying principles of public and social accountability are compatible with the moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. It was also found that CRE has been well established in public primary schools in all parts of BH. Furthermore, although a separate subject on civics in developed countries proved to be the most effective way to teach about democracy and active citizenship, the cross-curriculum model of explicit civic education has values on its own, especially in developing democracies such as BH where modern notions need the support of values of

indigenous culture in order to thrive. Given all that, it is our belief that in line with the models of explicit civic education, CRE in primary schools could be wisely used as means of citizenship education, thus engaging religion and RCs in creating a civic culture of public and social accountability among BH youngest generations and, ultimately, in the struggle against the widespread corruption in BH. As mentioned earlier in the text, in the public debate and political negotiations there have not been policy-relevant and clearly stated proposals concerning the role of CRE in this regard. Yet based on what was said and taking into consideration the comparative tendencies and experience in developed democracies in the world, the following three options could be distinguished.

*Transitional Approach to Civic and Religious Education (Transitional Approach):* This is the status quo policy whereby current educational policies are inconsistent in regard to explicit or implicit teaching about public and social accountability and their underlying values, while in both cases CRE is excluded from the process. In accordance with model of explicit civic education (ECE) recently adopted in the RS, civics are taught across different courses in the first 4 grades of primary schools and through a separate subject during one of the advanced years. On the other side, model of implicit civic education (ICE), as envisaged by the new Federation nine years education program, implies teaching about democracy and citizenship in line with principles of *hidden curriculum* and *civis as education norm*. With the current content of CRE curriculum and textbooks, this arrangement in both its versions excludes the possibility of teaching public and social accountability through religious education.

*The Religious Studies Approach Combined with Explicit Civic Education (Religious Studies Approach):* This second policy option demands a radical change and departure from the current practice. It proposes introducing a new non-denominational course on religions and democracy, while also insisting on decisive implementation of ECE in primary schools on the entire territory of BH. This new course would be taught in a descriptive and historical perspective in order to combine principles of democracy and active citizenship, on one side, and respective religious teachings, on the other. Proposals for introducing a non-confessional course on the culture of religions has been implicitly present in earlier criticisms leveled against CRE and explicitly in some policy studies (Alibašić, 2009), albeit its introduction was mostly justified as a way to prevent discrimination against students not involved in CRE. Such courses, however, are clearly present in proposals of many eminent European educationists (Jackson and Steele, 2004).

*Advanced Confessional Religious and Explicit Civic Education (Advanced Confessional Approach):* The third option envisions insisting on model of explicit civic education in primary schools and, within it, the appropriate fine tuning of current CRE curricula and textbooks so that they offer religious understanding of public and social accountability and their underlying principles in moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. While perhaps the most effective in civic enculturation of BH youth, so far nobody has made a proposal suggesting this kind of solution for deficiencies in the attitude of BH citizens towards public accountability. The previously mentioned initiative of CIVITAS BH, which eventually failed due to lack of financial support from the donors, comes closest to what we have in mind. The aim of this policy would be to improve the performance of the current model by making CRE more oriented towards preparing young generations for life in a democratic society that requires adequate engagement of all citizens in the process of governance in order to ensure accountable conduct on the part of public servants. This could be achieved by reinterpreting relevant religious teachings in the light of modern notions of public and social accountability as well as through adequate interventions in regard to



CRE content (curricula), means (textbooks and didactic accessories), human resources (teacher training), and pedagogies (didactics and methodology). Such alternatives are also present in proposals of European educationists (Jackson and Steele, 2004). The implementation of these measures, however, entails intensive cooperation and strong partnership between education authorities and RCs, which eventually would result in CRE that could more effectively work for preparing the young for life in a democratic society and state of law. It would implant in them a religious sense for public and social accountability, which is one of the pillars of democracy, thus achieving one of the main goals established by the Framework Law on Education and significantly speeding up the pace of democratization of BH society.

### 3.2. Framework of Analysis

The following criteria are proposed as a framework of analysis for evaluation of the three policy options: 1) contribution in teaching about underlying principles of public accountability (*effectiveness*), 2) grounding of the taught material in local cultural tradition (*cultural groundedness*) 3) opportunity to engage RCs in the public accountability campaign (*social comprehensiveness*). The following three constraints were identified: political and social feasibility, cost, and capacity.

The above goals and criteria were identified on the basis of the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in BH (2003), in light of the principles and underlying notions of democracy and public accountability as elaborated in relevant literature (Bovens, 2005), as well as indicators used in previous reports for the evaluation of democracy development (Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006), and the social comprehensiveness of anti-corruption measures first suggested by relevant NGOs (Blagovčanin, 2009) and then accepted in the strategy of the APCCC (2009). According to the Framework Law, formal education should aim to “prepare every individual for life in society that respects principles of democracy and rule of law” (Article 3, 2003) as well as to “develop awareness of commitment to the State of BH, to one’s own cultural identity, language and tradition” (Article 4, 2003). Furthermore, in line with the definition of culture, civic culture of public accountability stands for *a system of knowledge, beliefs, sentiments and values that structure attitude and behavior of citizens towards the issue of public accountability*. Since the notion of public accountability is intrinsically related to the idea of democracy and its underlying principles, relevant literature and earlier reports on democracy development usually suggest that the following indicators are used in evaluating which teaching materials meet the requirements of effectively educating about life in a society that appreciates the institution of public accountability and accordingly, democracy and rule of law:

- *Transparency is presented as a hallmark of good governance* (Bovens, 2005; Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006). This is a key indicator of public accountability, because no one can be held accountable for his/her actions unless citizens are informed about them. One of the problems in the prevailing culture is that people are not aware of the fundamental importance of transparency. The presence of this idea is revealing for our research.
- *Responsibility to justify one’s conduct is presented as an obligation of good governance* (Bovens, 2005; Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006). On its own mere transparency does not ensure accountability, but rather the knowledge that public actors have to justify their policies to citizens as repository of the ultimate sovereignty and be ready to accept the consequences of their (mis)conduct.

- *Integrity or acting according to the rules is presented as a mandatory characteristic of good governance* (Bovens, 2005). It must be very clear what public officials are answerable for. In other words, they are answerable for acting in accordance with established rules and in the best interest of citizens, whom do not accept biasness for any reason. Part of the problem in the prevailing culture is that flexibility can sometimes be seen as a “good thing”.
- *In terms of efficiency and efficacy, responsiveness of public officials to the needs of the public is encouraged* (Bovens, 2005; Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006). Public accountability is also meant to make public agencies as responsive to their clients as private sector companies are to their customers. Bringing attention to this idea is also revealing for our evaluation.
- *Civic participation in practice of governance through demanding that the above principles are to be respected* (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004; Fond otvoreno društvo BiH, 2006) *by public authorities is presented as a highly praised characteristic of an individual*. Without citizens’ willingness and eagerness to voice the above mentioned values and concerns in a democratic manner, the ideals of accountability become “inner thoughts”, losing their practical use of prompting social accountability on the part of citizens and thus bringing positive pressure on public officials to behave accountably. Such content reveals the sensibility of textbooks for the importance of active citizenship.
- *The analyzed content attempts to ground the underlying principles of public accountability in the cultural heritage of the students*. According to studies of successfully modernized countries, these states have succeeded in democratization of their society largely due to their ability to blend the basics of democracy with the values of the indigenous culture, thus giving rise to a distinctive democratic culture (Berger and Hefner, no date). Therefore, the extent to which the analyzed textbooks relate the modern concept of public accountability to religious values of indigenous culture sheds additional light on their educational quality in this regard.

Eventually, according to the already mentioned strategy of the APCCC (2009) and suggestions of relevant NGOs (Blagovčanin, 2009), the anti-corruption campaign should engage *all* relevant social institutions in raising civic awareness about the meaning and importance of public accountability and active citizenship.

As for constraints, political feasibility appears to be the main one. Social acceptance of CRE and civic education seems to be ensured. Although cost and capacity are rarely acknowledged by the stakeholders, they remain to be important preconditions for policy implementation given the nature of such proposals and the current economic situation in BH.





**Table I:**  
**The Framework of Analysis**

	Policy Options		
	1	2	3
Goals/criteria ▼	Transitional Approach	Religious Studies Approach	Advanced Confessional Approach
<i>Effectiveness</i>	Taught	Taught	Taught
Underlying values of public accountability taught	++-	+++	+++
<i>Cultural groundedness</i>	Not guaranteed	Guaranteed	Guaranteed
Underlying principles grounded in the religious tradition	---	+++	+++
<i>Social comprehensiveness</i>	Not ensured	Not ensured	Ensured
Engaging RCs and CRE in the public accountability campaign	---	---	+++
Costs	Current level +++	New course, textbook, teachers training ---	Teachers training, revision. ++-
<i>Social feasibility</i>	Small support	Small support	Wide support
Social acceptance	+--	+--	+++
<i>Political feasibility</i>	Secured	Not secured	Secured
Political acceptance	++-	+--	++-
Capacity	Very good	More teachers needed	Very Good
1) More teachers needed	+++	---	+++
2) Additional teachers training needed	+++	---	++-

### 3.3. Non-Preferred Policy Options

The strongest factor in favor of the continued implementation of the *current policy* seems to be the affordability of its costs and the availability of the capacities and political acceptance. Costs are there, but they seem acceptable for the authorities. In terms of capacity, the situation has been improved tremendously over last 14 years. Today teachers of civic education and other respective courses responsible for teaching civic values – including public and social accountability – have gone through trainings and certification organized by CIVITAS BH in cooperation with education ministries and institutions and they are therefore qualified to teach the course. The same goes for CRE. However, this remark actually only stands fully for the RS where the model of ECE is still followed in teaching about democracy and citizenship in primary schools. In the Federation where the respective ministry of education in its Nine Years Curriculum for Primary

Schools opted for the model of ICE, the new approaches actually require additional education and training of almost entire school faculties and administrations about the means of their implementation. As for political feasibility, educational authorities in the Federation, cantons and the RS seem to be content with the current status of both civic education and CRE. Nevertheless, the newest educational policy in regard to civic education in the Federation is not approved by the anti-corruption department of BH Ministry of Security (Jahić, personal communication, 2011) and is not in accordance with the earlier mentioned anti-corruption strategy of the APCCC.

If the new curriculum for primary schools receives its full implementation in the Federation, this option will fall very low on the criteria of effectiveness in teaching about public and social accountability as well as social acceptance. Studies have shown that pupils learn things they are explicitly taught about and not things they are not directly instructed. According to model of ICE, every faculty member has the responsibility to creatively incorporate civic spirit in his/her curriculum the end result of which very often is a diffusion of responsibility and is why this model has been abandoned in a large majority of EU countries (Šalaj, 2002). In addition, current curriculum and textbooks of civic education for primary schools in both BH entities do not make efforts to ground the principles of democracy and active citizenship in any religious component of the indigenous culture.

The same, however, goes for CRE textbooks in primary schools, as they have also failed to engage spiritual potentials of religion to promote specific pillars of democratic society and good governance. This in turn has probably slowed down and weakened the process of creating a culture of intolerance towards corruption. Although earlier reports showed significant improvement of CRE textbooks' content over time (Alibašić, 2009), in accordance with our hypothesis, our analysis of the CRE textbooks has shown that the basic values underlying the notions of public and social accountability are not purposively taught in the CRE teaching materials for primary schools. Thus, content lists in the CRE textbooks do not suggest – with few, albeit illusory exceptions – that the religious understanding of public and social accountability is going to be elaborated. Similarly, in the textbooks there is no explicit mentioning of the basics of accountable and good governance such as transparency, obligation to account for conduct to the public, efficiency and efficacy, or the need for active social involvement in demanding accountability. The textbooks, as expected, refer to plenty of historical events, ethical values, and themes that can be easily related to the principles of public and social accountability. The authors, however, largely fail to do so. One of Catholic textbooks (Razum, 2007), for example, opens the story about King David and his just rule with the promising title "The Life Journey of David – Power and Responsibility" but eventually misses the possibility to relate its messages to the issue of good governance. The same goes for the famous words of Abu Bakr, mentioned in a textbook of Islamic religious education, which he uttered upon his election for the first caliph of the Islamic state after the prophet Muhammad, openly calling to the people for obedience (or disobedience) to the extent that he is obedient to God's message and fulfilling their sacred rights. The speech is narrated in the textbook for 8<sup>th</sup> grade (Sulejmanović and Kapetanović, 2005) but not explicitly related to the issue of public accountability "here and now". Needless to say, religious virtues of morality, integrity, honesty, reliability, justice as well as vices of immorality, theft or unjust claiming of others' property are discussed throughout different textbooks of all three religious traditions (Grabus and Bašić, 2009; Jević, 2007; Ništović, Ništović and Valjevac, 2008; Periš et. al, 2007a; Pažin and Pavlović, 2007; Periš et. al, 2007b; Sulejmanović and Husić, 2010; Vrhovac, 2007), but interestingly almost never clearly illustrated and explicitly referred to as desirable characteristics of good governance and traits of power holders and public officers. The same stands for traits of courage and trustfulness, for instance, as a requirement for active civic engagement (Sulejmanović and



Kapetanović, 2005). As a result, if the educational principle that things that are not taught about cannot be learned either is taken as true, then textbooks of CRE have largely missed an opportunity to educate the youth about the religious understanding of public and social accountability, thus greatly confirming earlier reports that CRE in public schools hardly prepares pupils for life based in society on the principle of participative democracy (Trbić, 2007).

Finally, if the course on democracy in primary schools is to be judged on the findings about the level of satisfaction with it among secondary schools' pupils in BH, then the new Nine Years Program in the Federation will not meet support of pupils at primary schools either. As we explained, civil sector is also dissatisfied with the status of civic education in the Federation primary schools, while relevant civil organizations call for more active and constructive engagement of so called "national group courses", including CRE, in preparing young generations for life in a society based on principles of participative democracy. Although parents of all religious confessions throughout BH are supportive of the current status of CRE they too have joined in these calls. Even a number of theologians have publicly invited discussion for adjusting religious discourse to better accommodate the social and existential issues of the present.

For all the above reasons, it seems justifiable to look for ways to rectify the above mentioned deficiencies in the status and model of formal civic education as well as the role of religious education in BH in this regard.

The *Religious Studies Approach* is a radical step suggested for amelioration of the above shortcomings of the current educational policy towards formal civic education and role of religious education in this regard. The strongest aspect of this option is that together with ECE, the new non-denominational course on religions would effectively educate the young generations about the principles and values of public and social accountability and ground them in their religious identity. On the other side, this policy has been seriously contested on several grounds. First and foremost, although the international community, left-wing parties and NGOs generally have been supportive towards such possibility, RCs seem to be very reluctant towards introducing religious subjects whose curriculum and teaching would be outside their control due to fears that it might be used to teach against religion or in subverting the particular ethno-religious identities of BH peoples for the purpose of building a supra-national one (Alibašić, 2009). Therefore, it seems highly probable that this option essentially would not bring about the desired social comprehensiveness in promoting public and social accountability, as it would engage religious values but not respective RCs. In addition, as we saw, educational authorities are also very reserved about introducing new courses and burdening pupils with new subjects. Altogether this option does not seem to enjoy wide social or political support either.

Eventually, since the new course would be the first one of this nature in BH, lack of capacities and resources for its teaching are imminent. As result, its introduction would inevitably require developing the curriculum, producing new textbooks and training the teachers. During this time of pressure due to the economic crisis and unemployment in BH, burdening the public budget with extra expenditures does not seem to be an acceptable option for many.

Altogether, while keeping model of ECE in primary schools seems highly desirable and feasible, the radical solution for deficiencies in positioning religious education in this context does not look so. Therefore, the incremental change and fine-tuning of the current CRE should be the logical and simple way forward.

### 3.4. Preferred Policy Option

As has been shown, the status quo is unsatisfactory and a radical solution in positioning religious education in regard to civic education is not plausible and unnecessary. Therefore, the only feasible solution seems to be in incremental change and the fine-tuning of the existing CRE, while insisting on model of ECE in the schools. This would include the appropriate fine tuning of current CRE curricula and textbooks in order to offer religious understanding of public and social accountability and its underlying principles in Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, additional training of CRE teachers, upgraded pedagogies, and closer cooperation between education authorities, relevant NGOs and RCs. The following reasons make a strong argument for this position.

First, the model of ECE is widely adopted throughout the EU because of its effectiveness in teaching about active citizenship and promoting its values among the youth. The Netherlands seem to be almost the only European country still insisting on ICE. England, after years of its implementation, eventually switched to more effective models in 2002. Soon, the same steps will probably be made in the Netherlands too.

Second, with improved CRE curriculum and textbooks to accommodate for teaching about religious understanding and support for values of public and social accountability, this option would ground these civic principles in the confessional identity of young generations, thus lending them a taste of sacredness and religious duty and speeding up the ongoing campaign for democratization in the country burdened by the problem of corruption in public sector. This, in turn, would also imply not only the engagement of a religious message in developing civic values, but RCs too as they would be primarily responsible for this "undertaking" in civic consciousness of the youngest in their congregation through CRE in public schools, thus providing for social comprehensiveness in the ongoing campaign for creating a robust civic culture.

Third, if we are to make assumptions on the basis of studies and reports already conducted and prepared about the status of civic education in public schools as well as about the content of respective CRE textbooks, then we can assume that such proposals enjoy wide social support, including in RCs. In that sense, as pointed out before in this paper and contrary to already mentioned justifications for excluding civics from the curricula and textbooks (Bandić, 2011, personal communication), local NGOs and pupils in public schools are very much supportive of the explicit teaching of civics. Similarly, in their reports relevant NGOs together with parents and pupils (Trbić, 2007; Trbić and Kojić-Hasanagić, 2007) already invited educational ministries and RCs to revise and improve CRE curricula and textbooks in the light of today's needs of BH society and to better prepare pupils for life in a multi-religious and multicultural society based on the principles of participative democracy. The earlier improvements in CRE textbooks in regard to teaching about religious and cultural diversity are proof that RCs have been very receptive towards such suggestions. The overall focus on the issue of multiculturalism and ethno-religious tolerance in previous analyses initiated by NGOs and lack of knowledge about purely technical details might be actually only reasons why RCs so far have failed to shed more light on religious meaning and support for values of public and social accountability. This assumption and their support for this initiative actually have been confirmed through personal communication with representatives of the RCs (Begović, 2011; Jukić, 2011; Tanasić, 2011; personal communication).

Fourth, as for political feasibility, it seems that the last battle for more ECE in the Federation primary schools is still going to be waged between various stakeholders. Given the support of



the last APCCC anti-corruption strategy for a course on anti-corruption ethics (2009) as well as that of authorities in the respective anti-corruption departments at the State Ministry of Security (Jahić, 2011, personal communication), it is highly probable that the decision of the Federation Ministry of Education to switch to model ICE will not only trigger criticism from CIVITAS BH and other relevant NGOs, but also heavy fire and pressure from the future staff of the APCCC as well as the state Agency responsible for implementing the common core of courses which includes civic education. Under such circumstances, the Federation Ministry will either withdraw its earlier decision or respective canton administrations, using their legal jurisdictions in regard to educational policies, will simply ignore this decision. This obviously would be more than welcomed by many heavy players in the international community and would bring more harmony among formal programs of civic education in BH. Engaging RCs or CRE in primary schools in promoting values of public and social accountability is also a desirable thing according to experts in the anti-corruption department of the State Ministry of Security.

Finally, this option is also very feasible in terms of capacity and costs as it actually would only require the revision of existing CRE textbooks, something already practiced on a regular basis by the RCs, and additional training of CRE teachers, a responsibility that CIVITAS BH, with willingness and cooperation of the RCs, is ready to take upon itself. As previously mentioned, in last 15 years CIVITAS BH has been very successful in producing textbooks of civic education as well as in the training and certification of the teachers.

In conclusion, civic education in primary schools and during formative stages of human development represents one of the most important cornerstones for developing a civic culture of public and social accountability among the future generations of BH citizens and for a success of preventive approach in the struggle against corruption in BH. In the current situation of urgency pressuring the BH state and society, this analysis has shown that the most effective way for implanting this cornerstone is through the means of explicit, formal civic education engaging all cultural forces and educational capacities including those of religion and CRE. Nevertheless, the successful and consistent implementation of such policies by respective authorities in BH cannot bring about the impossible: overnight positive change in the attitude of BH citizens towards the institution of public accountability. In the long run, and together with other anti-corruption measures, however, it will progressively but more expediently and more firmly ground the principles of active citizenship and good governance in the religious values of the indigenous culture, minds and hearts of BH peoples, urging them to act responsibly whether they are in the role of the governing or the governed.

#### **4. Conclusion and Recommendations**

In light of the above discussion, the following conclusions can be made:

- Robust civic culture is one of the main pillars of democracy and good governance. Although BH citizens are fully aware of the widespread presence of corruption in the public institutions, the current attitude of BH citizens towards public and social accountability is characterized by several deficiencies. They include: a misunderstanding of notions of a citizen and democracy, a strong sense of apathy and helplessness in regard to active civic participation and the possibility of socio-political change, among some even tendency to justify such misconduct of public officers and ordinary people, and readiness to get involved in such acts under specific circumstances.

- Formal civic education in primary schools represents one of the standard measures in promoting values of good governance and active citizenship in EU countries. ECE, however, is a model adopted in an overwhelming majority of developed democracies. In addition, teaching civic values through religious education is highly recommended in documents of the Council of Europe and is a regular educational practice in many EU countries.
- Moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy are compatible with the values and principles underlying the notions of public and social accountability and would be a valuable resource in promoting values of good and accountable governance and civic activism. Nevertheless, textbooks of CRE in public primary schools completely overlooked this cultural capital of their respective religious traditions by failing to relate relevant historical and moral lessons – otherwise present in the textbooks – to the notion of good governance and institution of public accountability.
- This period might be a turning point for the status and nature of formal civic education as well as for the role of CRE in BH primary schools in regard to promoting public and social accountability. The Federation’s Ministry of Education has adopted a completely new and less effective approach to civic education while representatives of the RCs have been under continuous pressure from the international community and local NGOs to modify discourse of CRE in order to better accommodate for the pressing needs and issues of here and now, including life in a society based on participative democracy.
- Keeping the initial approach to ECE while improving and fine-tuning the CRE textbooks’ content would be the most logical, effective, feasible, socially and politically acceptable option for investing in efforts to rectify the existing deficiencies in the civic culture of public accountability in BH by the means of formal education. This approach takes into consideration the most effective international practices in formal teaching about civics in general and public and social accountability in particular and places religious education in this context. It considers the fact that moral teachings of Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy are compatible with principles of accountable governance and active citizenship. It weighs the current high approval of pupils and relevant NGOs for ECE along with recent calls from the international community, local NGOs and parents that say that discourse of CRE needs to be improved in order to be in line with the needs of life in a society based on participative democracy. It also looks at the respectable status of CRE in public schools as well as the practical desirability of grounding “imported” ideas in the indigenous system of values along with the decent level of receptiveness on the part of the RCs in regard to earlier suggestions. Finally, it also takes into consideration the measures proposed in the last anti-corruption strategy and general BH legal landscape that allows for cooperation between state and the RCs in matters of mutual interests.
- Radical change is simply not feasible, realistic or even needed or desirable. Improvement and fine-tuning of CRE, on the other hand, would consist of the revision of CRE curricula for primary schools, textbooks and teaching methods, and continuous CRE teacher training.
- In terms of its advantages, this approach scores extremely high on almost all criteria of our analysis. It has proved to be effective in teaching about civic values, including principles of public and social accountability while grounding the taught material in values of indigenous culture. It is socially comprehensive in the sense of employing educational, cultural and motivational capacities of religion, the RCs, CRE and individual religious conviction and, exclud-



ing the tiny portion of those who are against the presence of CRE in public schools, it enjoys wide social acceptance. Additional investments and consequent costs are minimal and if reacted to promptly and in coordinated cooperation with respective ministries, the APCCC, Agency for Implementing Common Core of Courses, the international and domestic organizations, the political feasibility would not be questioned either. The only potential disadvantage is that pupils voluntarily not attending CRE will not benefit from the improvements, which, however, might be rectified by introducing an alternative course on the Culture of Religions for them that eventually can implement the suggestions of our study as well.

- With the support of public educational authorities, the proposed measure can be reasonably expected to do a good job in explaining the religious significance of public and social accountability, thus lending religious sacredness to this mode of public and social conduct. By integrating the RCs and religious people into the mainstream, society will be able to put them under pressure to be more socially accountable too.
- There are several critical areas in formal civic education for public and social accountability that require urgent and coordinated attention of public authorities, the RCs, international and local organizations. They include: The Nine Years Education Curriculum for Primary Schools in the Federation in its part concerning civic education and its future implementation by cantons, improvement of the CRE curricula and textbooks, training of CRE teachers, and improving overall relationship between the main stakeholders.

#### **(a) Recommendations to Government**

- Insist with the respective Federation and canton ministries on the implementation of the explicit model of civic education in primary schools. The content and textbook of a separate subject on civics could also be conveniently used to accommodate for the APCCC anti-corruption measure aiming to educate the youth about the importance of the fight against corruption and professional ethics through formal programs of education in days to come.
- In order to engage CRE in teaching about principles of public and social accountability efforts should be immediately renewed in order to build cooperation and partnership with the RCs in the areas of curriculum and textbook development and teacher training. CIVITAS BH would be an excellent counterpart in this endeavor as well.
- In cooperation with the RCs, start working immediately on an evaluation of the existing CRE curriculum and textbooks with the view of determining whether they promote values of good governance and active citizenship and aiming at their consequent improvements in the light of religious understanding and support for these modern concepts.
- Make sure that the process leading to the revision and improvement of CRE curriculum is sensitive to the needs and practices of the RCs and that it allows other relevant stakeholders to voice out their opinions.
- Through seminars and on-the-job training, ensure that CRE teachers are familiarized with the religious understanding and support for values of public and social accountability and that they do not fall behind their colleagues in terms of skills and knowledge required for teaching about the importance of good governance and active citizenship.

- Examine to what extent existing teacher-training institutions and CIVITAS BH are capable of providing the necessary professional training for teaching CRE in a way that promotes public and social accountability and points to a firm grasp of various teaching methodologies.

### **(b) Recommendations to Religious Communities**

- In the context of a preventive approach to the fight against corruption, strengthen cooperation and partnerships with public authorities, international and domestic organizations. Raise social awareness about the importance of public accountability and active citizenship in general and teaching about these values through CRE in public schools in particular.
- During potential future revisions of the CRE curricula and textbooks, assist education authorities in providing an authentic religious understanding of good governance and active citizenship with the view to prepare the CRE for teaching about these modern principles in the light of religious traditions.
- Keep up with the latest international best practices in the field of civic education through religion and CRE in public schools as well as with pedagogies through regular seminars and workshops.
- Ensure that discourse of the RCs and CRE is addressing social ills and the pressing needs of wider society including weakness of the current civic culture in the context of a fight against corruption in the public sector. Start with a critical evaluation of existing CRE textbooks as there are plenty of examples that could be skillfully and without distortion to authentic religious message used to ground modern values of public and social accountability in religious identity of the youngest believers.

### **(c) Recommendations to International and Domestic Organizations**

- Shift the focus from the negative aspects of the RCs and CRE and consider the means and ways through which religious messages could be used in promoting active citizenship and public accountability to satisfy all involved parties.
- Take all the necessary measures to build trust with the RCs, including the assurance to them that the aim is not to secularize religious teachings and CRE, that the official interpretation of religious messages ultimately belongs to the RCs, and that involved organizations' statements and activities are consistent with such an assurance.
- Assist the RCs and education authorities in introducing recommended modifications into CRE and consequent teachers training.
- Provide support for an empirical study aiming to assess the impact of CRE so far in promoting values of good governance and active citizenship among the pupils.





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